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BLACKMAIL FROM A TO C
JOSEPH ISENBERGHt

Did you dig up something I can use againstFirefly?
We follow him to a roadhouse where he meets a married
lady.
Spymaster
A married lady? Now we are gettingsomewhere.
Chico Marx: Yeah. I think it was his wife.
Spymaster:
Firefly has no wife.
Chico Marx: No?
Spymaster:
No.
Chico Marx: Then you know what I think, Boss?
Spymaster:
What?
1
Chico Marx: I think we follow the wrong man.
Spymaster:

Chico Marx:

INTRODUCTION
The term "blackmail" has been attached to a number of relations
where one person extracts something of value from another with
pressure. My concern here is limited to "pure" or "informational"
blackmail: the sale of silence by someone who is otherwise free to
disclose what he knows. The cast of characters in a blackmail must
number at least three. I call them "A," "B," and "C." "B" (for
"blackmailer") is the holder of information that he threatens to
disclose unless compensated. "A" is the person to whom B offers to
sell his silence, and is usually the subject of the information to be
kept silent. "C" is the person or persons to whom B threatens to
disclose the information, absent agreement with A. C may be an
individual, a group, the public, or a representative of the public
such as a prosecutor. In this triangle, B is an intermediary who,
depending on the legal regime, may advance or impede the flow of
information concerning A to C.
A key element of "pure" blackmail, which has led some to
question whether it should be treated as a crime, is that B is initially
free to make the disclosure over which he bargains with A.
Blackmail, as addressed here, does not include threats of disclosure
barred by statute or contract, such as a doctor's threat to reveal a
patient's loathsome disease, which belong to the broader class of

t Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

1 DUCK SOUP (Paramount 1933) (slightly paraphrased).

(1905)
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"extortion."

Extortion, obtaining something with the threat of
inflicting unlawful harm, is a form of theft by force. Much violent
crime has an element of extortion. "Kiss me or I will kill you" is a
threat to do something that is no more permitted absent the threat
than with it. In contrast, B's bargaining lever in blackmail is
something that normally is within B's right. The criminal prohibition of blackmail-essentially a prohibition on bargaining between
B and A over control of information-denies B the right to seek
compensation from A for not doing something B is otherwise free
to do.
On first encounter there is no obvious reason for this restraint
of B's (and A's) freedom: Why impede the allocation of rights in
information that unconstrained bargaining would otherwise
produce? That question is one way of framing what is called the
"paradox of blackmail." In most contexts other than the disclosure
of information, people are free to bargain over permissible courses
of action. It is through bargaining that rights in property (and
information is property of a kind) migrate to the hands of owners
who value them the most. When A and B own contiguous parcels
of land on which building is allowed, for example, it is no crime for
B to threaten to build on his lot and impair A's view unless A pays
him not to do so. 2 The case of contiguous lots serves in the
literature as a standard counterpoint to informational blackmail.3
Numerous other transactions recognized as legitimate or even
salutary involve "threats" to do something lawful unless paid or
otherwise rewarded to abstain. "Pay me higher wages or I will go
on strike or quit," "pay me the price I am asking for this good or I
will sell it to someone else," and "marry me or I will shave my head
and join the Foreign Legion" are, I think, permissible threats almost
anywhere, while "paint my house or I will tell your boyfriend about
your sex change operation" and "if you fire me I'll tell the IRS
about your secret Swiss bank account" are blackmail.
Threats of the latter type often elicit a strong aesthetic reaction.
Indeed blackmail has drawn unusually intense condemnations from
otherwise sober sources. "The blackmailer is both contemptible and
dangerous; from the standpoint of his victim he is more to be
feared than a burglar or a thief."4 This response resists fully
2

A possible outcome of bargaining between B and A in this situation, among

many, is A's purchase from B of a scenic easement.

3 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV.
655, 670-71 (1988).
4 ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW
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satisfactory explanation, however, even upon prolonged introspection. Scholarly accounts of the prohibition of blackmail are widely
contradictory; none seems to me entirely satisfying. But despite the
obvious difficulty of explaining the crime of bargaining over
permissible conduct, commentators have generally defended the
prohibition of blackmail.
Two broad ideas run through the writing on blackmail. One
condemns the threat to privacy. In this view A is B's victim, forced
to pay to protect a personal sphere that should remain private. The
other finds in blackmail the opposite vice of concealing wrongs that
should be revealed. In this view of blackmail B and A are cooperating, conspiring even, to keep valuable information from C. In factand this is where the paradox of blackmail ultimately lies-the
prohibition of blackmail serves both ends to a degree. My concern
in this Article is whether prohibition of blackmail serves these ends
well enough, or whether some other legal regime for bargaining
over private information might be preferable.
The prohibition of blackmail affects the allocation of rights in
information. I argue in this Article that the prohibition of blackmail
leads to relatively greater disclosure of a smaller body of information,
because on the one hand B is more likely to disclose information
about A to C when prevented from bargaining with A, but on the
other hand, not being able to extract the full return from bargaining
with A, B has less incentive to seek out information about A in the
first place. In a frictionless world (one in which it were costless to
bargain over the value of information), prohibition of blackmail
would surely not be correct. For most rights in property other than
information, even in our world of significant transactions costs, both
analysis and experience suggest that prohibition of bargaining is
likely to impede the appropriate allocation of those rights.
The justification for the prohibition of blackmail, if there is one,
must therefore lie in the particular nature of information. The
transactional difficulty and cost of bargaining over the disclosure of
information are greater than for other forms of property. Unrestricted blackmail might lead to much vexatious and ultimately
(1931). Also widely quoted is the following-deliberately overblown-statement of
Bechhofer Roberts: "Blackmail is by many people considered the foulest of crimesfar crueller than most murders, because of its cold-blooded premeditation and
repeated torture of the victim; incomparably more offensive to the public conscience

than the vast majority of other offenses which the law seeks to punish .... " Coase,
supra note 3, at 659.
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sterile bargaining. This is especially so if the cost of bargaining over
information is understood broadly to include the inducement of
effort by would-be blackmailers to unearth information destined
simply to be reburied. Even with such an extended notion of cost,
however, the prohibition of blackmail is not self-evidently justified.
The costs saved under prohibition must be weighed against the
possibly better allocation of rights in information under a regime of
freer bargaining.
I conclude in this Article that across-the-board prohibition of
blackmail, although likely not of momentous effect on behavior,
may not be the best regime. A possible alternative would be to
retain the prohibition of blackmail for: 1) information, however
acquired, held by B concerning a prosecutable crime or tort
committed by A against C; and 2) information acquired by B outside
a prior course of dealing with A. For these classes of information,
a further alternative to the criminal prohibition of bargaining would
be simply to make B's agreement with A not to disclose information
unenforceable and to treat B's receipt of compensation for silence
as a form of complicity in whatever is kept silent. Agreements to
keep other kinds of information silent would, by contrast, be both
valid and enforceable. The present law of blackmail would be
replaced by a regime concerned with distinguishing two types of
contracts of confidentiality, enforceable and nonenforceable. The
idea behind the regime would be to impose on blackmailers part of
the social cost of the concealment of information when the
information were more valuable disclosed, while not inducing an
untoward increase in efforts to uncover private information.

I. BLACKMAIL As PROHIBITED BARGAINING
What is prohibited under the law of blackmail is a certain type
of bargaining over the disclosure of information, rather than the
bare result, which is some sort of compensation given for silence.
It is B's threat of disclosure that is barred, not any and all reward
from A for B's discretion. 5 Thus if A spontaneously offers to
reward B's discretion regarding private information, or simply does
so without bargaining, there is no prohibited blackmail, even if it is
likely that B's discretion would end with the withdrawal of the
reward. The law of blackmail is in this respect like that of prostitution, which usually bars specific bargaining over the sale of sex

5 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985).
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rather than all transfers of wealth in consideration of sex. 6 If a
sexual relationship is sustained by gifts (either from gratitude or
from concern that it would not continue if the gifts were ended or
reduced), few legal regimes that otherwise allow the kind of
relations involved would pursue the transaction. Once B has
acquired private information about A, blackmail is, much like
gambling, prostitution, trade in narcotics, etc., a victimless crime.7
A (who is often identified as B's "victim") would almost invariably
prefer the possibility of bargaining with B over the alternatives. If
there is a victim of a blackmail in the conventional sense (someone
who bears the uncompensated external cost of a transaction
benefitting others), it is C.
II. THE EXTENT OF BLACKMAIL
Blackmail is not a major day-to-day concern of the criminal
justice system. On first encounter, in fact, blackmail seems a matter
of mainly academic concern. Scholars have written about it with
some regularity, but on any given day there are probably a thousand
times more prisoners serving time in our jails for crimes related to
cocaine than for blackmail. For all I know at this writing there may
be no one in an American jail convicted of what might be called
"classical" or pure "informational" blackmail.8 Popular fiction, on
the other hand, views blackmail as rampant. In the archetypical
soap opera Dallas,9 for example, a blackmail, often successful, was
de rigueur in at least every other episode. The actual extent of
blackmail in daily life is not readily knowable to an academic
observer, but is very likely greater than the sparsity of appellate
decisions on the subject might indicate. Certainly many proscribed
acts are carried out beyond the immediate attention of the criminal
6 See id. § 251.2.
7 This may not be so, however, if the antecedents of the blackmail bargaining are
taken into account. IfB has made a specific effort to uncover information concerning
A, then A can plausibly be viewed as a victim of the transaction as a whole. A would
certainly not prefer B's pursuit of his secrets to B's engaging in some other endeavor.
8 There are, of course, convicts who have extorted money or property from others
with threats of violence. That is not informational blackmail.
9
Dallas (CBS television broadcast).
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courts.1 0 A successful blackmail (one in which B and A come to
agreement) by its nature tends to remain hidden, and never appears
on television's Unsolved Mysteries. 11 A further difficulty is determining the point at which ubiquitous minor threats molt into
prohibited blackmail. A parent's threat to tell a child's playmates
that he sleeps with a nightlight unless he cleans his room fails
literally within the Model Penal Code's definition of criminal
coercion. 12 So does an employee's threat to inform the IRS of his
employer's concealed income unless promoted.13 A prosecutor
would be perhaps more likely to pursue the latter threat, if it

became known. I suspect, without having any systematic empirical
basis for the belief, that the largest single class of blackmails, both
subtle and overt, involve tax obligations that A has slighted in some
way and that B knows about. The Model Penal Code clearly makes

it a crime for an employee to seek advantage by threatening to
reveal an employer's tax evasion and would also, as I read it, make
it a crime for a spouse to seek a larger divorce settlement with a
similar threat.

III. BLACKMAIL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Property rights are largely shaped by the law of crimes. The
assignment of property rights to those who value them most reduces
the necessity of exchanges or other transactions to bring them to
higher valued uses. An important function of a legal regime is,
therefore, to maintain property rights in the hands of owners who
value them most. The definition of most crimes is easily understood in light of these principles. The prohibition of murder
accords an individual the property right in his own life; the
prohibition of battery frames an individual's rights in his body; the
14
prohibition of theft sets the contours of other property rights.
That life is worth more a priori to its owner than to any other
10 Prostitution, for example, although prohibited in most states, is visibly
widespread. Those engaging in it are frequently arrested, but few spend much time
in jail after conviction. The total prison population of those convicted of prostitution
and related crimes is probably small. The number of appellate cases dealing solely
with the crime of prostitution is probably as sparse as those on blackmail.
11 Unsolved Mysteries (NBC television broadcast).
12 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5(1)(c) (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes

1985).

15 See id. § 212.5(1)(b).
14 Criminal prohibitions do not exhaustively define property rights, of course.

There are also tort laws, liability rules, etc.
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person is revealed by the rarity of exchanges in which someone
consents to being killed for a payment from another who would
enjoy doing it. That people value their bodies more than batterers
can similarly be inferred from the infrequency of their consenting
to being beaten for a fee. If homicide and accidental killing were
legal, people would have to take far greater pains to protect their
lives through individual force, bargaining, and other transactions
aimed at regaining control over survival. Relations between people
in such a world would have the character of blackmail. People
would abstain from killing each other in consideration of some
advantage implicitly or explicitly bargained for.
At issue in blackmail is the right to control the disclosure of
information. The starting point of any blackmail is B's possession
of information, usually about A, that A does not want communicated to C. Specifically, A will suffer a cost from the disclosure of this
private information to C. Almost always, C will gain something
from learning the information. One way for B to derive a benefit
from the information, absent the prohibition of blackmail, is to
offer not to disclose the information to C in exchange for payment
from A. The most B can get from A with the threat of disclosure is
what disclosure would cost A. This cost may involve money (an
income tax deficiency and fraud penalties, for example), jail time,
embarrassment, loss of a marriage, loss of ajob or a coveted elective
position such as the Presidency, and much more. I call the full cost
to A of disclosure the "value" of the information to A. B will
bargain for something like the monetary equivalent of this value,
but in practice, given the uncertainties of measurement and A's
likely limited means, B is bound to settle for less.1 5 The value of
the information to C is what C stands to gain from learning the
information. Depending on who C is, this value may be the
collection of a tax deficiency and penalties, a larger divorce
settlement, a tort recovery, the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity,
the titillation of prurient curiosity, the vindication of an ideological
concern, or simply the requital of animosity against A. The value of
the information to C may even be negative. That is, it may concern
something that would compel some sort of change in C's actions or
attitude toward A and that C would accordingly rather not know.
15

This lesser value can be measured in money, utility, or some combination of

both.

HeinOnline -- 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1911 1992-1993

1912

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:1905

A predicate of blackmail is that B's disclosure would be costly to
A, whether or not the underlying information is of value to C. Also
necessary is that B value the information less than A. 16 Often the
element of greatest uncertainty is the value of the information to C.
If we could determine the flow of information costlessly from some
sort of meta-vantage point, we would want the information held by
B to be disclosed to C when its value to C was greater than its value
to A, 17 but to be kept private when it was worth more to A. There
being no omniscient traffic controller, we generally leave it to
private bargaining to steer property rights to owners who value
them most. In the case of private information, however, the
prohibition of blackmail prevents bargaining between B and
someone with a large stake in controlling the information, namely
A. Immediate questions are: 1) whether the prohibition thereby
prevents the flow of information to those who value it most; and 2)
if it does, what is gained.
IV.

ESTABLISHED THEORIES OF BLACKMAIL

A first place to look for answers to these questions is in
established explanations of the law of blackmail, which fall into five
broad classes.
A. Prohibitionof Blackmail as Protectionof Privacy
Under this view, the prohibition of blackmail represses B's
maltreatment of A by denying B a reward for threatening A's
privacy.1 8 The principal concern here, albeit given effect somewhat paradoxically, is the privacy of A, who is viewed as a victim.
In this view of blackmail, the defining pattern is the case where the
information held by B is worth more to A than to C. It might, for
example, cause A deep pain for C to know the information, while C
would benefit little. The vileness of B's threats and the lurid
rhetoric of B's "slow torture" of A are enlisted in support of
prohibition. The natural habitat of such blackmail is nineteenth
century fiction. A, now a paragon of virtue in all respects, had an
16 Were it otherwise, B would use the information to his advantage rather than
seek to sell control over it to A or C.
17 1 use the word "value" here to denote the cost to A of disclosure.
18 For a more detailed discussion of the role privacy concerns play in blackmail's
prohibition, seeJeffrie G. Murphy, BlackmaiL" A Preliminaty Inquihy, 63 MONIST 156,
163-64 (1980) (arguing that in the absence of criminal sanctions prohibiting blackmail,
there would be incentives for invasions of privacy).
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illegitimate child given up for adoption long ago. A is engaged to
marry C, who is loving and kind, except inclined to be a touch
inflexible on the subject of bastardy. B learns of all this. The
prohibition of blackmail prevents B from making demands of A.
For some of the proponents of this view of blackmail, I think,
the prohibition of bargaining between B and A serves as a proxy for
a prohibition of B's disclosure to C. That is, the premise that B is
free to disclose or keep secret private information about A is not
fully accepted. At least one commentator, who calls B's freedom to
disclose an "immoral liberty,"1 9 clearly believes that an honorable
person in B's position would keep silent gratuitously. But instead
of prohibiting B's disclosure of private information, the law of
20
blackmail denies B a profit from the threat of disclosure.
There are numerous cases where the holder of private information-a doctor or lawyer, for example-is under an express or
implied contractual obligation to hold it in confidence.2 1 Someone outside the fiduciary relationship-a patient named B, for
example, who overhears a doctor blurt out sensitive medical
information about another patient named A2 2 -is not bound by this
restraint. The law of blackmail creates an obligation of sorts from
B to A in this situation, which is not to threaten A with demands in
exchange for silence. Those whose main concern is with protection
of privacy would perhaps want to impose on B an obligation not to
disclose at all, which is equivalent to according A an absolute
19 GOODHART, supranote 4, at 179. Goodhart classes such liberties with the right
to get drunk at home, sleep around, or tell tall tales. See id.
20 In fact, by virtue of the prohibition of blackmail, B is freer to disclose than to
conceal, because B cannot use concealment as the basis of an exchange with A, but
may use disclosure as the basis of an exchange with G.
21 With doctors and lawyers, confidentiality is unequivocally, albeit customarily,
understood and backed up by codes of professional conduct. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) (stating that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents");
PINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 4 (Am. Med. Ass'n 1984) (stating that "[a] physician
... shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law"). In other
cases it is less clear. The proprietor of a bath house with a homosexual clientele
could well be understood to have undertaken to keep the names of his customers
confidential, especially if he ever made representations of providing discreet service.
A customer of the bath house, however, would have no such obligation to another
customer, unless the terms of patronage implied keeping all encounters anonymous
or confidential.
22 Thinking he is alone, the doctor muses, "My God, A is HIV positivel Who
would have thought it?" Or, if you think that the doctor's indiscretion somehow
affects B's obligations in this situation, suppose instead that it is A who says, "My
God, I'm HIV positivel" within B's earshot.
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property right in all information concerning A. Such a measure,
given the fluidity of rights in information, would quickly reveal itself
impractical. 23 B is instead denied the right to profit from silence.
The protection of A's privacy by the prohibition of blackmail in
such situations is, on first encounter, perverse. Once B learns of
the information, the prohibition of bargaining most likely endangers
A's privacy. The only benefit now available to B from the information lies in disclosure to C. The prohibition of blackmail in this
instance thus sacrifices A's privacy to the end of denying B the best
return from knowledge of the information, because once B has the
information the prohibition makes disclosure more likely. But to
deny B the right to bargain with A (the one who values the information the most) reduces the return B can derive from discovering the
information in the first place and may therefore deter B from
sniffing around for compromising secrets. Thus, while the privacy
of any specific A may succumb on the altar of prohibition, over time
the privacy of generic As is less likely to be invaded by predatory Bs,
who may find other investments of their time and effort more
profitable than digging up scandal that cannot be sold to the
probable highest bidder.
This theory of blackmail seems aimed above all at professionals
who make a business of obtaining secrets for the purpose of selling
them back to those concerned. The approach is colored by the
suspicion that, given free rein, blackmailers would obtain information in unpleasant or even illegal ways, by prying, snooping, or
burglary. 24 A closely correlated view is that the force of legal
sanctions against these ancillary evils is far too weak. 25 Thus, in
addition to the concern for the protection of A's privacy, there is a
concern for the unattractive and harmful predicate of legalized
blackmail that would transform a certain number of Bs, now
otherwise engaged, into legally licensed predators. 26 True, A may
2 Even rights in proprietary information break down once the information passes
into the hands of someone not in some sort of contractual privity with the subject of
the information. In most situations of potential blackmail, B is a party to no actual
or implied contract with A.
24 Perhaps the cleaning crews in office buildings would routinely comb the files
of doctors and lawyers for compromising secrets. Or perhaps Bs would pay court to
affluent As, smothering them with kisses and other kindness to the sole end of
gaining their confidence. Please note, however, that any given A who has no guilty
secrets will gain mightily from all this kind attention, while Bs will be out the time
and effort of a fruitless search.
25 See Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail Inc., 50 U. CH. L. REv. 553, 565 (1983).
26 For a lurid view of the outpouring of fraud and deceit that would follow the
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suffer most from the prohibition once B has the information, but
prohibition will deter B from sniffing around, to the ultimate
benefit of others with shameful secrets.
A problem with this view of blackmail is that prohibition of
bargaining tends to force A's secrets into the open where B is an
amateur who has come upon the compromising information in the
normal course of events. This objection is not fatal, however,
because an amateur B may in any event be more interested in a
nonpecuniary gain that can more easily be derived from disclosure
to C. If, in the first example above, B is another suitor of A, or A's
rival for C's affection, B may well prefer to disclose the information
to C without making any demand on A. To generalize, the
prohibition of blackmail achieves the end of protecting private
information if its deterrence of would-be professional blackmailers
outweighs the greater difficulty for A of retaining control over
information adventitiously discovered by the likes of B.
B. Prohibitionof Blackmail as an Instrument of Disclosure
Under this theory, the prohibition of blackmail promotes
disclosure of information. Bargaining between B and A, to the
extent it is successful, denies to C information in which C has an
interest. If the information has greater value to C than to A, 27 the
bargaining leads to a net loss. In this theory of blackmail, A and B
are to some degree in complicity as wrongdoers and C is their
victim. B's wrongdoing consists of cooperating with A against C,
while A's wrongdoing includes cooperation with B as well as having
done whatever it is that A and B agree to keep quiet. An example
of blackmail well accommodated by this theory is B's threat to
disclose knowledge of A's income tax evasion. C in this case is the
public, represented by the U.S. Treasury. 28 Another example is
B's knowledge of A's hidden assets that A might lose to C in a
pending divorce action if C also knew of them. In such cases, the
legalization of blackmail, see id. ("Only blackmail breeds fraud and deceit.").

Witchcraft, money lending, alcohol, and homosexuality have all, at various times, been
criminally prohibited. Imagine the lurid scenarios that could have been devised-and
doubtless
were-to stave off their legalization.
2
7 This explanation of the prohibition of blackmail puts greatest weight, at least
implicitly, on the cases where the information has greater value to C than to A.
2The pecuniary value to the public of information on A's tax evasion is at least
equal to A's pecuniary benefit from concealment. Knowledge of A's tax fraud would

gain the TreasuryA's delinquent taxes, plus penalties, along with the value of future
deterrence of A and others.
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prohibition of bargaining between B and A makes it more likely that
B will disclose the information to C.2 9 The prohibition of blackmail is thus an instrument of disclosure.
It is not, however, a very powerful one. Often B cannot get
from C an amount close to the full value of the information. The
U.S. Treasury, for example, pays informants a maximum of ten
percent of the back taxes collected from the tax evaders they turn
in. 3° More broadly, it is often difficult for B to communicate to
C the value of the information without communicating the information itself. Moreover, there are ways B can deal or attempt to deal
with A short of prohibited blackmail. Without ever threatening A,
B can let A know of his exemplary discretion and expect to be
rewarded for it. If B is A's employee, B's knowledge of A's tax
evasion (if A knows that B knows) may do much for B's job security.
Still, there is doubtless some margin at which the prohibition of
blackmail brings more private information to C than C would get if
B and A could easily agree to suppress it.
C. The Blackmaileras Rogue Agent

In this theory of blackmail, B should not be allowed to profit
from information in which others have a greater interest. The idea
here is that rights in information should somehow be reserved to
those for whom it has "inherent" value rather than value derived
from bargaining. In the standard blackmail situation, B's only
interest in the information is what A or C will pay for it. B neither
suffers A's loss from the disclosure to C nor can make as profitable
use of the information as C. In this view of blackmail, the value of
the information-what Professor Lindgren calls the "leverage" it
brings-does not belong to B, who is therefore prohibited from
bargaining over it with A. 31 When B bargains with A, B is capturing a benefit that more properly belongs to C, or, again in Professor
No law of blackmail that I know of prohibits B from bargaining with C.
See I.R.C. § 7623 (1992) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to "pay such
sums, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum appropriated therefor, as he may deem
necessary for detecting and bringing to trial ... persons guilty of violating the
internal revenue laws"); Rewardsfor Information Given to the InternalRevenue Service,
6 IRS Manual (CCH) Exhibit 9370-3, Pub. No. 733, at 28,195 (providing that the
District Director shall pay informants "10 percent of the first $75,000 recovered, 5
percent of the next $25,000, and 1 percent of any additional recovery").
31 SeeJames Lindgren, UnravelingtheParadoxof Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670,
672 (1984).
29
30
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Lindgren's terms, is using "leverage that belong[s] more" to
32
another.
Under this theory of blackmail, B is a usurper. Professor
Lindgren describes blackmail as B's "misuse of [another's] leverage."33 This implies a greater right in someone else, and enlists
B into some sort of agency relationship with this other person, C.
34
Professor Lindgren describes B's bargaining with A as "unfair."
But unfair to whom? To C, it would appear. B, although apparently
not required in this view of blackmail affirmatively to advance C's
cause,3 5 may not seek to gain from keeping C in the dark.
This theory of blackmail largely assumes its own conclusion.
The premise that B's leverage "belongs more" to C essentially
contains the conclusion that B's gain from bargaining with A should
be barred, because the leverage belongs more to C than to B only
if blackmail is a form of prohibited theft in the first place, or
because some sort of fiduciary obligation of B to C is implied. C has
no leverage simply by virtue of B's possession of private information
about A before any bargaining has occurred, and will not get any
unless B gives or sells him some. By C's "leverage" Professor
Lindgren means, I think, information that has in some way a greater
intrinsic value to C than to B. In the situation that sets the stage for
blackmail, however, the immediate pecuniary value of the information is greater to B, because until C discovers the information, C
cannot derive much benefit from it.36 One can also question
whether under this theory of blackmail B should be allowed to
bargain with C, rather than simply turn over the information free of
charge. Here, though, I think the theory does not require B to give
the information away to C. B can reasonably ask to be compensated
for having served C in an agency relationship, albeit involuntary.
This theory of blackmail starts by finding existing leverage in C,
but does not account for how or why it is there. What, beyond the
prohibition of blackmail itself, gives C leverage that C would not
otherwise have with respect to information concerning A? A
practical aspect of the problem is figuring out who has what
32 Id.

33 Id.
4Id.
35 Professor Lindgren does not, I believe, question B's right to remain silently
aloof. If it is wrong, however, for B to use leverage against A that belongs more to
C, isn't it also at least wrongish to deny to C (by total silence) the leverage that more
properly belongs to him?
V6 See Lindgren, supra note 31, at 672.
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leverage to begin with. Suppose B recognizes A as a fellow death
camp guard and seeks money to keep it quiet. Is the C to whom
that leverage properly belongs an immigration official or prosecutor? What if A no longer has any exposure to legal sanction and
faces only loss of reputation? Does the leverage belong to no one?
To Jews and Gypsies because they have some strands of DNA in
common with A's victims? Or perhaps to historians? Suppose
instead that A was a death camp commandant and that B, a former
camp inmate, recognizes him and demands that he dedicate himself
to the relief of holocaust victims as a condition of nondisclosure.
Is this now B's leverage?3 7 Is it different if B asks A for money in
this situation? Is it different if B uses the money for a good cause?
The question "whose leverage?" is likely to be answered by the
fortuity of the questioner's a priori sympathy with the person and
plight of A, B, or C respectively.
D. Blackmail as PrivateEnforcement of Criminal and Moral Rules
The only theory of blackmail surfacing in academic writing that
would not prohibit the transaction finds in the blackmail bargain a
mechanism of private enforcement-through the agency of B-of
criminal laws or moral standards.38 If A has done a bad thing that
B knows about, B's threat to disclose it is a form of punishment of
A. B is collecting a fine of sorts, as well as inflicting a measure of
pain. Blackmail could conceivably serve as a useful check on the
sort of bad actions of A against which C (who would in this instance
often be the public) has poor means of discovery or enforcement.
37 B may have decided, for example, that there is more social good to be gained
from A's future good works than from A's exposure and prosecution.
58 No published writing that I know of embraces this view, but it is considered,
and taken fairly seriously, in William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 42 (1975) (noting that "practices
indistinguishable from blackmail.., are permitted in areas where the law is enforced
privately.., because the overenforcement problem is not serious"). Several of the
papers presented in this Symposium acknowledge the possibility of blackmail as a
mode of private enforcement, but none endorses the idea fully. See, e.g., Steven
Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmai4 Extortion, and
Robbey, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1877,1879-94 (1993) (discussing how potential victims will
reduce their vulnerability to threateners); Jennifer G. Brown, Blackmail as Private
Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1935, 1937 (1993) ("Even if one could demonstrate with
certainty that blackmail could efficiently deter crime, most people would probably
resist decriminalization."); Richard A. Posner, Blackmai4 Privacy, and Freedom of
Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1825 (1993) (stating that "blackmail is a form of
private law enforcement, so in areas where private law enforcement is banned ...
blackmail should be banned").
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These might include white collar crimes, or acts widely considered
immoral or dishonorable although not legally prohibited.
In this view, blackmail would serve the ends of social control,
and a blackmailer could be considered an agent of the public. If
blackmail were permitted, the possibility of being blackmailed might
deter A from engaging in conduct that would give B a lever with
which to pry out some compensation. People might commit fewer
crimes if, in addition to risking public prosecution and penalty, they
risked having to share the benefit with some private person who
found them out. This is the only theory of blackmail I have
encountered that is concerned to any extent with the effects on A's
behavior.
Any benefit from blackmail in the form of an incentive for good
conduct by A, however, is likely to be marginal. For most crimes,
private persons have even lesser means of discovery than the
public.3 9 B is not going to get rich tracking down bank robbers
and shaking them down for blackmail. B is far more likely to get
dead in this line of work.4" The idea of blackmail as private
enforcement is somewhat more plausible when it is directed at
conduct beyond the reach of criminal laws or tort law, but, as
discussed at greater length below, the most that can be expected
from exposing private conduct to blackmail may only be somewhat
greater discretion in people's private conduct.
E. Blackmail as Deadweight Loss
This theory of the prohibition finds in blackmail a source of
deadweight social loss. Suppose that, absent any legal restraint on
blackmail, B were successful in bargaining with A over his silence.
Their agreement would leave the same distribution of information
as before they bargained. B and A would therefore have invested
time and effort in a transaction that brought nothing new. It would
be as though they had dug a hole and filled it up again. So viewed,
" Certain crimes-mostly white collar crimes such as tax evasion-may in fact more
easily be detected by a private person than by public enforcers. To permit blackmail
of tax evaders could conceivably, therefore, reduce their return from the evasion.
Offsetting this, however, would be the greater ease for tax evaders of buying silence
and hence avoiding detection.
40 If individuals were accorded investigative powers for "hard" crimes, the state's
monopoly on force would be considerably modified. While this may not be wholly
untenable, to espouse such a regime in the sole context of blackmail seems contrived.
If you take seriously the idea of blackmail as private enforcement, why not adopt the
idea of private enforcement of crime across-the-board?
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bargaining between B and A to the end of keeping information
known only to them undisclosed is a pure waste. The prohibition
of blackmail curtails sterile transactions of this sort by removing the
incentive to acquire private information for the sole purpose of
keeping it undisclosed. In contrast, bargaining between B and C is
all right in this view, because it tends toward a new distribution of
information.
In the form just stated, this theory of blackmail proves too
much. Unless qualified in some way, it would, for example, prohibit
bargaining between B and A over B's plans to build on a lot
contiguous to A's land. If A buys a scenic easement from B, the
physical condition of their lots remains the same as before. Their
bargaining is nonetheless not pure waste. What has changed,
beneath the surface, is their property rights. And because A values
a view more than B values the right to build, their combined rights
are more valuable. More broadly, something does happen in a
blackmail bargain: a refraining of property rights between A and B.
It is part of the transactional cost of life that a possible outcome of
any bargaining is to leave things the same.
To be sure, one ought not to encourage pointless bargaining,
but across a broad range of situations there is no substitute for
bargaining to shift property rights to new owners who value them
more. It is therefore not decisive that nothing conspicuous happens
if B and A conclude a bargain over information. A has more secure
control over the information than before as a result of the bargain.
All transactions entail transaction costs, which are at worst a
necessary evil. It would be paralyzing to prohibit all bargaining
aimed at leaving the surface of things undisturbed. The allocation
of social cost is permeated with bargaining that looks very much like
what is called "blackmail."
There is an early version of this theory of blackmail in the
writing of Robert Nozick, who casts the blackmail bargain as an
"unproductive" exchange, and contrasts it with the payment to a
next-door neighbor to abstain from building, which he views as
"productive." 41
Nozick deems even the transaction with the
neighbor "unproductive," however, if the neighbor has no interest
in building and "formulates his plan and informs you of it solely in
41 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-85

(1974) ("Though

people value a blackmailer's silence, and pay for it, his being silent is not a productive
").
activity. His victims would be as well off if the blackmailer did not exist at all..
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order to sell you his abstention from it."42 Nozick's assertion
notwithstanding, the latter exchange is in fact productive given the
more valuable allocation of property rights that results. 45 In more
recent writings, Ronald Coase, the acknowledged godfather of legal
analysis based on transaction costs, propounds the prevention of
wasteful transacting as the only plausible basis for the law of
blackmail, but also recognizes that prohibition of bargaining,
without more, throws out the baby with the bath. 44
Although clearly overbroad, this theory of blackmail gives a
better account of the prohibition than the others, because it
recognizes that what is ultimately at issue in the prohibition of
blackmail is transaction costs. There is no other way to explain the
law of blackmail. The distribution of rights in information under
prohibition is not the one we would choose in a frictionless world.
If prohibition achieves the best result possible in the real world, it
does so paradoxically, by eliminating a substantial part of the
property rights of holders of private information. Since we
normally seek to approximate through the choice of a legal regime
the same distribution of property rights as in a frictionless world,
the prohibition of blackmail is justified only if there is something
uniquely different about bargaining over information compared to
other bargaining.
V. BARGAINING OVER BUILDING ON CONTIGUOUS LOTS
Where rights other than in information are at issue, it is hard to
see what is gained from constraints on bargaining. Consider, again,
the case of contiguous lots owned by A and B. If B has the right to
build on his lot in a way that would impair A's view, B might seek
compensation from A for not building. This transaction falls into
the formal pattern of blackmail. Indeed, if B has no interest in
building for its own sake and wants only to profit from selling an
easement to A, B's announced intention to build is blackmail as
42 Id. at 85.
43 Nozick's landowner is better off than if the neighbor had sold his lot to
someone else who wanted to build on it, a possibility that is now permanently

foreclosed.
44 See Coase, supra note 3, at 671-72. As Coase also notes, there is in the writings
of Pigou the extraordinary suggestion that all bargaining should be prohibited
because, taken by itself, it is a pure cost. See A. C. PIGOU, THE EcONOMIcS OF
WELFARE 201 (4th ed. 1932) ("It is obvious that intelligence and resources devoted

to ... [bargaining]... yield no net product to the community ....

These activities

are wasted.").
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defined in the Model Penal Code. B's bargaining with A ought,
nonetheless, not be prohibited, no matter what the intrinsic value
B attaches to building. When A values an open view more than
anyone else values building on B's lot, prohibition of bargaining
only interferes with the best outcome. If prevented from bargaining
with A, B might go ahead and build even though he values building
less than A values a scenic view. Moreover, as a practical matter, B
can always assert or feign some interest in building on the lot. Or
B may seek out some potential buyer of the lot, C, who does want
to build. If B cannot bargain with A, B can benefit from the right
to build only by selling to C. As an owner who does attach inherent
value to the right to build, C can go ahead and build, or sell the
right to A. If A values a disengaged view more than B gains from
the sale to C, a sale of B's lot to C simply increases the chances that
things will turn out wrong. 45 Finally, A is likely to welcome B's
offer of a bargain. A would almost certainly prefer to have the
chance to buy an easement than to wake up one morning to the
sound and sight of bulldozers on B's lot. In the end, the prohibition of bargaining between B and A only complicates the course of

transacting and only makes it harder for the one who values it most
46
to gain control over the right to build on B's lot.
One possible response to the pattern just elaborated is that the
initial assignment of the property right-here the assignment to B of
the right to build-was wrong. In a given case, to be sure, an initial
assignment to A of the right to prevent B from building might have
worked out better, that is, might have led to an appropriate final
distribution of rights at less transactional cost. But generally, if the
desire to build and the craving for a disengaged view are distributed
45 If A values the right to build more than C, A might then buy the right from C
and C might resell the lot (now no longer for building) to yet another who does not
want to build. C's gain would be the amount by which A values the right to a view
more than C values the right to build (which will have been reflected in the price paid
by C to B). It would appear that part of what B could originally have gotten from A
has been diverted to C, who has in effect served as a conduit for the right from B to
A. B might even be able to get from C some part of the additional value of the view
to A, if it is absolutely certain that C can sell an easement to A at full value. In fact,
the bargaining will be complicated at every stage by uncertainties of value and the
possibility that someone else down the line will have a change of heart. The
prohibition of bargaining almost surely increases the chance of a bad outcome, that
is, that the right to build ends up with someone who does not assign the highest value
to it.
46 Bargaining also permits a broader range of resolutions-such as B's agreement
to build less obtrusively-aimed at maximizing the combined value ofA's and B's lots.
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randomly, no initial assignment of rights imposes itself. As long as
the opportunity and difficulty of bargaining are symmetrical, the
transactional burden in cases where B sells A an easement under
one regime is no greater than the burden under the other regime
of sales by A to B of the right to build.
VI. BARGAINING OVER INFORMATION

When the right at issue between A and B (and ultimately C) is
control over information, the same outcome is desirable in the
abstract. B's information should be controlled by A or disclosed to
C according to whether A or C values the information more. Unlike
the case of contiguous lots, however, the regime of free bargaining
between B and A does not clearly tend toward that result. What
shapes the particular course of bargaining in blackmail is that the
underlying rights consist entirely of information, a form of property
different from others in significant respects. Information is less
susceptible to exclusive ownership than other property; it is hence
more costly to appropriate and to transmit, and the return from
information is generally independent of the amount invested in
it.47 Bargaining over information raises unique problems.
If allowed to bargain without constraint, B would be more likely
to sell silence to A than to disclose the information to C, regardless
of the value of the information to C. With information concerning
A, the course of bargaining between B and A is by far the easier. B
and A already know the information; C does not. Indeed, in the
normal setting of blackmail, A knows more of the value of the
information than C knows of its very existence. Regardless of who
ultimately values the information the most, at the time of a potential
blackmail bargain, B stands to gain more from the effort of
bargaining with A, who already knows the value of the information.
B cannot bargain with C over the value of the information without
revealing some part of it, thereby reducing the amount still
undisclosed. If C is the public, B must bargain with some proxy,
such as a newspaper or magazine that will pay for a circulationboosting story. If blackmail were legal, in short, B would tend
47 See Kenneth Arrow, Informationand Economic Behavior, reprintedin 4 COLLEGTED
PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROw 136, 142-43 (1984).

Another aspect of bargaining
between B and A over information is that it approximates a bilateral monopoly. To
be sure, C is to some extent in the picture, but to a less significant degree than in
other kinds of bargaining. With information, the bargaining is more completely
contained between B and A.
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48
consistently to try to sell silence to A rather than disclosure to C.
The outcome of bargaining that leaves no change in the surface
distribution of rights is more likely when information is at issue,
regardless of the values assigned to the information by A and C.
Concerns over deadweight loss are thus especially acute in bargains
over information. The simplest way to make the point is that a bad
outcome is a more likely result of bargaining over information than
of other bargaining, so that the transactional cost of the bargaining
itself is less obviously justified.
Information is a ubiquitous source of transaction costs, to be
sure, and complicates the course of many kinds of bargaining. In
bargaining over building on contiguous lots, for example, A and B
may need (and in any event will likely gain from) information about
market values, potential buyers, and the like. The cost of such
information may well affect the course of bargaining. B is more
likely to bargain initially with A, who is close at hand, than seek out
some unknown buyer. But the bias toward bargaining with A is less
systematic than in cases involving pure information. In blackmail,
the bargaining raises problems of information about information.
In analyzing blackmail, we cannot assume a world of perfect
information without assuming away the entire problem, whereas
with other problems (including, I think, A's and B's contiguous lots)
the assumption of perfect information is a step toward uncovering
the best legal regime.
We can safely posit, therefore, that unfettered bargaining
between B and A would not lead to the same allocation of rights as
in a world of perfect information. That does not mean, of course,
that prohibition of bargaining induces the best possible allocation of
rights in information. In practice, the prohibition of blackmail
prevents bargaining from following its natural course between B and
A and, indirectly, strengthens C's hand in acquiring information
held by B. With B denied the (legal) benefit of bargaining with A,
disclosure to C is more likely. B also has less to gain from acquiring
information about A in the first place. The prohibition of blackmail, therefore, leads to more disclosure from a smaller body of
information held by B. Perhaps that is why defenders of privacy
and proponents of disclosure both find merit in the prohibition of
blackmail. Whether the absolute amount of information disclosed
to C is greater or lesser than under the regime of free bargaining is

48

This is probably so even with the prohibition of blackmail,just somewhat less.
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hard to say. While the prohibition of blackmail is likely to have
little effect on the type of information adventitiously discovered by
B about A, it may bear on what sort of information B deliberately
seeks out. Under prohibition, B has more reason to seek out
information of interest to C than information merely costly to A.
This effect is likely to be small, however, because it is difficult in
any event for B to get full value for information in dealings with C.
The prohibition of blackmail creates for C leverage that C would
not otherwise have with respect to information concerning A. And
this at B's expense. The prohibition of blackmail, in broad terms,
shifts rights in private information discovered by B to C. While it
is not a tax, it is similar to one in that it reduces the value to B of
a certain kind of economic activity-the discovery of informationand has the same likely effect of reducing the extent of that activity,
to the advantage of A's privacy. The "tax" also reaches information
obtained by B as a windfall, and shifts part of the windfall advantage
to C. Some part of the potential windfall-possibly larger than C's
on average-goes back to A in the cases where B simply remains
silent without seeking compensation from anyone. Across the full
range of situations both C and A get part of the value that is denied
to B, which is why the prohibition of blackmail can plausibly be
viewed as serving the ends of disclosure and privacy.
VII. AN ALTERNATIVE REGIME FOR BARGAINING OVER
PRIVATE INFORMATION

While the particular nature of rights in information lends
plausibility to the prohibition of blackmail, it by no means disposes
of the question whether prohibition leads to the best practical
allocation of those rights. In weighing a change in the legal regime
for blackmail, three considerations come into play. The most
important concern in framing a regime for bargaining over private
information is to enhance the likelihood that it will be controlled by
the one who values it most. Two other concerns, both related to
the main concern, involve the effect of a given regime on underlying conduct: first, the incentives to invest resources in discovering
information and bargaining over it (in our triangular scenario these
are the incentives for B); and second, the incentives for those whom
the information concerns (A in our alphabet) to leave it exposed to
discovery by B in the first place. These elements are specifically
correlated under different regimes for bargaining over information.
Prohibition of blackmail limits cooperation between B and A to
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keep C uninformed, thereby apparently increasing disclosure to C;
the prohibition, however, also likely cuts down effort by B to
acquire information concerning A, thereby reducing the body of
disclosable information, and thus may in the end make it somewhat
easier for A to engage costlessly in the course of action that gives
rise to the information.
These three effects are, I imagine,
increasingly attenuated in the order just given. If blackmail were
permitted, C would on balance find out less of the information
concerning A held by B, B would invest more effort in uncovering
information about A, and A would accordingly want to be somewhat
more guarded in leaving a trail of information, either by changing
conduct or by engaging in the same conduct more discreetly.
A regime of wholly unrestrained bargaining over private
information would, on balance, bring little or no advantage. It
would, at the outset, give A more control over the disclosure of
private information held by B. Since the blackmail bargain taken by
itself is efficient when it involves information worth more to A than
to C, at least something would be gained. On the other hand, the
greater ease of suppressing information more valuable to C than to
A would entail a loss. Furthermore, a regime of wholly free
bargaining over private information would have ancillary effects on
the conduct of B, and even A. Any gains from A's greater control
over private information must therefore be weighed against the
possible cost of B's increased efforts to unearth information and A's
own cost of preserving privacy. Once B is allowed to bargain with
A, he would surely have a stronger incentive to seek out private
information about A that he might otherwise leave alone. While
there may be scant cause to fear that Bs would give up productive
economic activity in droves and instead frantically comb their
environment for guilty secrets about As, there would doubtless be
some effect, little of it good.4 9
It is not necessary, however, to take free bargaining absolutely
or not at all. Between flat-out prohibition of bargaining and wholly
untrammeled bargaining are numerous gradations of freer bargain49

Journalists, for example, might be somewhat more inclined to uncover stories
for the sole purpose of covering them up again, while it would be better for them to
pursue stories that can be more profitably sold to the public. Ajournalist employed
by another (a newspaper publisher, for example) is, to be sure, obligated as an agent
not to usurp the information for personal gain, wholly independently of the law of
blackmail. Concerns about information professionals therefore involve mainly

freelancejournalists, owners of newspapers, and similarly entrepreneurial gatherers
of information.
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ing than is now allowed. Sketched below is the outline of a regime
for bargaining over private information that is preferable, in my
view, to the present unqualified proscription of blackmail.
The first objective of any regime for bargaining is to leave
control over information with the one who values it the most.
Ideally, B would be free to bargain with A over information that is
more valuable to A than to C. At the same time, B would be
discouraged, if not more forcibly prevented, from bargaining to
suppress information more valuable to C. The threshold question
of blackmail can therefore be restated: is there any way a priori to
determine what information is more valuable kept private and what
information is more valuable disclosed?
To do so is certainly not easy, and may ultimately be impossible.
Some inferences can be drawn, however, about the respective public
and private value of some information. These arise in identifiable
situations where the disclosure of information, rather than its
suppression, is more consistent with the assumptions underlying the
definition and allocation of other property rights. Consider, for
example, information about prosecutable crimes. If the public
benefits from the prohibition of a crime-and generally it does-it
follows that the public gains more from the discovery of the crime
than the criminal gains from concealing it. An arithmetically clear
example of this principle is tax evasion: the public (through the
Treasury) gains at least what the evader loses by discovering the
fraud. Similarly, most tort law reflects a preferred allocation of
social cost. If B knows of a tort committed by A against C, G's
acquisition of the knowledge will likely bring a better allocation of
social cost than the suppression of that knowledge by A and B. The
existence of a compulsory process for obtaining information in
criminal proceedings and tort actions assumes a net social advantage
from the discovery of this information. To the extent the underlying crimes and torts are appropriately defined, this advantage is
real. 50 Information about a crime or a tort committed by A-which
is the class of information commonly subject to compulsory
process-is among the most likely to be of greater value to C than to
It is true that if a given criminal prohibition is inefficient, to prohibit blackmail
against those who have committed the underlying crime makes things worse. A
dvoui of freedom who thinks, for example, that gambling and prostitution ought not
to be illegal would be likely also to think that gamblers and prostitutes ought to be
able to buy their privacy.
50
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A. In other cases, it is at least possible that information held by B
will be more valuable to A than to C.
In this light I offer the following tentative first rule for bargaining over private information: B cannot legally bargain with A to
suppress information about a prosecutable crime or tortious act
committed by A. 51 Although perhaps not obvious, it is unnecessary to treat as crimes bargains that are invalid under this rule. It
is sufficient, indeed preferable, simply to make them unenforceable.
A gains no real control over disclosure from an unenforceable
bargain with B. And if B cannot assure A of any increased control
over disclosure, B cannot extract much from A, and therefore has
little reason to invest much effort in bargaining. In contrast, if
blackmail is made a crime, A gains considerable control over
disclosure from entering into a bargain with B, because B, by
incurring the criminal exposure of a blackmailer, can now sell A a
much higher likelihood of silence. To be sure, after a blackmail
bargain between B and A, B's disclosure is not literally proscribed.
But B's disclosure also exposes the blackmail, and so may be costly
to B. If the penalty for blackmail is severe, B's disclosure after
having bargained to agreement with A is in fact prohibitive. 52 The
criminal prohibition of blackmail, therefore, makes the blackmail
bargains entered into across the threshold of prohibition highly
enforceable. 53 If A and B both want to bargain, they will often do
51 It might further be helpful to frame the information over which bargaining is
unlawful as information that C could obtain from B through compulsory process in
an action based on the underlying crime or tort. I am not sure at this writing,
however, that the availability of compulsory process to C is ultimately a workable
touchstone of the line between lawful and unlawful bargaining. The problem is that
in certain grand jury proceedings, according to academic colleagues, a broad range
of information can be elicited by a prosecutor. The test therefore should be limited
at all events to information discoverable by compulsory process at trials for crimes
and tort actions, where the information is bounded by a requirement of relevance to
the matter at hand.
52 In nineteenth-century English law, blackmail was a felony punishable by life in
prison. See GOODHART, supra note 4, at 179. That is more than enough to give B
pause over revealing himself a blackmailer.
53 Taken literally, the prohibition of blackmail makes A's use of B's risk of
prosecution in order to deter B's disclosure a form of blackmail itself. "If you
disclose my secret, I'll expose you as a blackmailer and you'll go to jail" is yet another
threat encompassed by the Model Penal Code's definition of blackmail. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 223.4(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In the standard blackmail
situation, however, A does not have to make this threat, because it is implicit in the
situation. But ifB is a very stupid blackmailer, A may have to bring the point home
explicitly. For connoisseurs of blackmail paradoxes, I offer this one: a blackmailer
with a very low I.Q. may drag his "victim" into committing blackmail.
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so despite the prohibition of blackmail. When they do, the
prohibition, on balance, strengthens A's hand. To make blackmail
agreements unenforceable is likely, in sum, to cut down bargaining
and increase disclosure compared to the alternative of making them
crimes.
A possible further element of this regime, in addition to making
the blackmail bargain unenforceable when it involves crimes or
torts, would be to treat B's compensated silence as a form of
complicity in whatever is kept silent. This would expose B, in the
event of disclosure, to some part of the legal consequences befalling
A. The blackmailer who has been compensated for concealing
knowledge of a crime or a tort would thus be exposed to criminal
penalties or tort liability, as the case may be, if these were ultimately
visited on A.5 4 The idea would be to impose on blackmailers part
of the social cost of the concealment of information in cases where
the information was more valuable disclosed. If, in contrast, it was
disclosure that brought net social cost because the information was
of a type more valuable kept secret, B's cooperation in the concealment would bring no liability.
The point of this proposed regime is to curtail bargaining over
information that should be disclosed, while permitting it when the
likely result of bargaining-concealment-is significantly preferable
to disclosure. Some bargaining between B and A over disclosure of
information not involving A's crimes or torts would therefore be
permitted. A concern in framing permitted bargaining, however, is
not to open the door to systematic information-farming by blackmailers bent only on profit from suppressing what they have
uncovered. To this end, we would want to distinguish, if possible,
between information already held by B (or obtained fortuitously)
and information generated by B's special efforts for the purpose of
blackmail.55 While it is difficult to find a perfect touchstone
' The consequences of disclosure to B need not, of course, be exactly the same
as for A. They should in general be milder.
55 The present law of blackmail, to an extent, already tends in this direction.
Because A, but not B, may initiate bargaining, present law leaves a relatively open
path to bargaining when A and B have a prior course of dealing from which A can
figure out how much B knows. If, for example, A has written B a compromising
letter, A can offer to buy it back, while B cannot offer to sell it. A is far more likely
to know of information growing from a course of dealing with B, and thus be able to
initiate bargaining, than to know of information acquired by B through anonymous
investigation. To this extent, present law is more favorable to bargaining over
information already held by B (which is bargaining that can be initiated by A) than
to bargaining generated by B's information-farming.
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identifying these two classes of information, a possible proxy for the
distinction would be to permit B and A to bargain over information
(not concerning crimes and torts, of course) only when B and A
have a pre-existing relationship. This test, admittedly imperfect,
goes some distance nonetheless toward separating information
obtained fortuitously from information deliberately farmed.5 6 A
would not be exposed to blackmail from someone with whom he
had never dealt.
In summary, the new legal regime for bargaining over private
information would be the following:
1.

2.

3.

Contracts not to disclose knowledge of prosecutable crimes
and torts would be invalid and unenforceable. To enter into
such a contract would in addition imply a measure of complicity in the underlying crime or tort.
Contracts not to disclose private information entered into
between persons with no prior course of dealing would also be
invalid and unenforceable.
Other contracts not to disclose private information would be
valid.

This regime would give rise, between persons who have had
some prior dealing, to a new class of enforceable contracts of
silence. The existence of a binding obligation between A and B
would largely eliminate the "slow torture" routine that arouses the
indignation of commentators. Once B has been compensated for
remaining silent, B's subsequent try for a second helping with the
threat of disclosure can be countered by A's own threat of a damage
action or even prosecution, depending on the strength of the
sanctions backing the enforceability of contracts of silence. A is no
worse off than if there had been no initial agreement.
Given our small experience with contracts of silence, it is hard
to say exactly what such a contract might look like. A likely feature,
though, along with the obvious element of B's silence, is some
provision for the event of disclosure of the underlying information
from a source other than B. For example, if C discovered the
information from any source (other than A) within a period of time,

5 A possible circumvention of the test would be for B, having dug up information
on A, to enlist an associate of A's, B1, to bargain with A, or perhaps simply for B to
sell the information to B1 for Bl's own use. Even assuming, however, that such
indirect transactions could not be prevented by qualifications of the test, the return
to B from unearthing information, now shared with B1, would be reduced enough to
make the undertaking less attractive.
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B would owe A a partial or total refund of the contract price. An
agreement without such a clause would give A little protection from
other disclosures or other blackmailers and would accordingly be
worth much less. With it, both B and A stand to gain from the
preservation of A's privacy.
With some protection (albeit less than perfect) from the purely
predatory blackmailer, A would have a significant measure of
control over his own privacy. A might, to be sure, have to deal with
threats of disclosure of information by opportunistic friends,
acquaintances, associates, even enemies. But A has at the outset
some control over what each of them may know. With respect to
this class of information, A is likely to be the lowest cost avoider of
untoward disclosure, and there is no obvious reason to protect A
from bearing the full cost of preserving his own secrets. Under this
regime, A would have somewhat more to gain than under current
law from attending to his own privacy by such measures as weighing
his casual disclosures in advance and choosing his friends, confidants, and sexual partners carefully. In contrast, the prohibition of
blackmail reduces the advantage of those who are careful of their
own privacy compared to those who are reckless with it.
The kind of private information B might hold over A, even
excluding information on A's crimes and torts, covers a broad
range. Some involves actions that are immoral or socially harmful,
such as lying, cruelty, and unrestrained self-indulgence. Other
information involves actions or conditions not bad in themselves (or
even voluntary), such as private sexual predilection or illness, that
are nonetheless embarrassing or painful when made public. The
former class is more likely to involve dealing with others in some
way, if only as victims, than the latter.57 The test I have suggested
In his talk at the Symposium for which this Article was written judge Posner
described the following recent instance of blackmail. B, intending to blackmail a
married homosexual, spent time at a place where homosexuals habitually rendezvous,
where he met A, ascertained that A was married, and invited A to his house nearby,
where they had sex. B videotaped this sexual encounter with A and blackmailed A
with the tape. B's blackmail was discovered when he unthinkingly sent the tape to A's
home (where A's wife found it), and B was convicted and jailed. Judge Posner offered
the case, United States v. Lallemand, No. 92-2178, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6423 (7th
Cir. Mar. 29, 1993), as an instance of the vulnerability of married homosexuals to
blackmail.
However that may be, Lallemand is not a case of blackmail for an involuntary
condition (homosexuality). A's exposure to blackmail did not flow simply from his
homosexuality. A chose to marry someone from whom he concealed his sexual
orientation, and to seek out other sexual partners at a place of anonymous
encounters. The predicate of the blackmail in this case, being fully of A's own
57
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for permissible bargaining therefore favors privacy in more purely
private matters, while placing the cost of potentially harmful
conduct more fully on those who engage in it.
CONCLUSION

As its title indicates, this Article is not the last word (or even
letter) on blackmail. The problem of blackmail belongs to the
broader problem of framing a legal regime for rights in information. The analysis of social cost in blackmail transactions is, for this
reason, more difficult than for other crimes. The paradox of
blackmail, restated in these terms, is that the prohibition of
bargaining leads to a distribution of rights in information which,
though not optimal in a world of zero transactions costs, may
nonetheless be the best attainable.
Several commentators concerned with social cost have concluded that the prohibition of bargaining is desirable because agreements to suppress information are nonproductive. But when the
information is worth more to A (that is, concealed) than to C (that
is, revealed), the blackmail bargain, viewed in isolation, is productive. A's control of the information is more secure, and the
alternative-disclosure-leaves A, B, and C in the aggregate worse off.
Possible gains from blackmail bargains viewed atomistically do not
in themselves, however, justify the regime of free bargaining over
private information, which is worthwhile only if the larger cost of
bargaining (which includes the creation of incentives for would-be
blackmailers to seek out private information) is offset by a more
valuable allocation of information resulting from the bargaining.
The balance of advantage between these two regimes is not selfevident.

making, was anything but involuntary. It is not immediately obvious why the law
should have protected A from an ill-considered, or even unlucky, choice of
extramarital lover.
Because A and B had a voluntary course of dealing (even though B in fact
deliberately set out to acquire compromising information about B) B's demands on
A here would be permissible under the regime proposed in this Article. It is clear
from this instance that the test I have proposed would not weed out all blackmail
based on deliberately cultivated information. But to permit the blackmail in
Lallemand would quite possibly be the right result on balance, measured by social
cost. B's acquisition of information entailed little more cost or effort than the activity
that A might otherwise have carried on with a different companion not bent on
blackmail. The net investment of resources in the information over which B and A
bargained was therefore likely to have been small. B's opportunism hardly inspires
admiration, to be sure, but it entailed little net social cost.
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Across-the-board prohibition of blackmail has the advantage of
simplicity. Its cost lies in the potential denial of control over private
information to the one who values it most. To permit bargaining
without restraint might also, however, given the asymmetry of
bargaining opportunities between B and A, and B and C, lead to the
suppression of some information that would be profitably disclosed.
Furthermore, unrestricted blackmail might induce excessive
investment in the discovery of, and bargaining over, information of
lesser value to C than to A. Nonetheless, I think a plausible case can
be made for freer bargaining between B and A over the disclosure
of private information, not concerning A's crimes or torts, when A
and B have had a prior course of dealing. I reach this conclusion
even though it may well be that the gains from improved allocation
of rights in information would be roughly balanced by a possible
increase in costly transacting. What tips the scales in my mind
toward freer bargaining is, first, the suspicion that the prohibition
of blackmail is widely ineffective. Much bargaining over private
information, explicit and implicit, doubtless goes on in the teeth of
prohibition, which itself adds a measure of anxiety and risk to the
process. Second in the balance favoring freer bargaining are
possible gains, little noticed in the literature on blackmail, 58 in
A's incentives to guard his own privacy.

58 Except in the passing notice of blackmail as a method of private enforcement.

HeinOnline -- 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1933 1992-1993

HeinOnline -- 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1934 1992-1993

